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Abstract—In behavioral economics, anticipatory agents are
cognitive systems that make decisions by taking into account
the probability of future decisions (plans). We consider the in-
teraction between anticipatory agents and statistical detection. A
sensing/computing device records the decisions of an anticipatory
agent. Given this sequence of decisions, how can the sensing
device achieve quickest detection of a change in the anticipatory
system? From a decision theoretic point of view, anticipatory
models are time inconsistent meaning that Bellman’s principle
of optimality does not hold. The appropriate formalism is the
subgame Nash equilibrium. We show that the interaction between
the anticipatory agents and sequential quickest detection results
in unusual (nonconvex) structure of the quickest change detection
policy. The methodology presented yields a useful framework for
situation awareness systems and also interaction of anticipatory
human decision makers with automated sequential detector.
Glossary of Symbols
Anticipatory agent. Sec.II and III
s1, s2 physical state
z1, z2 psychological state (5), (12)
a1, a2 actions (4)
µ∗1, µ
∗
2 Nash equilibrium policy (10), (8)
V1(·), V2(·) value function
Quickest detection. Sec.IV
n discrete time n (also agent n)
xn jump state (for quickest detection)
P transition matrix of {xn, n ≥ 0} (19)
f, d false alarm and delay penalty parameters
Anticipatory agents acting sequentially. Sec.IV
sn physical state
zn psychological state
an1 , an2 local decision maker’s actions
ηn private belief of local decision maker n (20)
µ∗n,1, µ
∗
n,2 Nash equilibrium policy (10), (8)
yn private observation of xn at time n
Bxn,yn observation likelihood p(yn|xn) (21)
T (pi, y) private belief update (22)
σ(pi, y) normalization measure for private belief
Global Decision maker. Sec.IV and Sec.V
un action at time n ∈ {1(stop), 2(cont)}
φ∗(pi, s) optimal policy for quickest detection
pin public belief at n (20)
Rpix,a(s) action likelihood p(a|x, pi, s) (24), (25)
T¯ (pi, a, s) public belief update (23)
σ¯(pi, a, s) normalization measure for public belief
V(pi, s) value function
C(pi, u) costs incurred in quickest detection
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is an early step in understanding the interaction
between statistical detection and behavioral economics mod-
els. Signal processing and behavioral economics are mature
areas; yet their intersection, namely interaction of human
decision makers with sensing based detection is relatively un-
explored. We consider sequential decision problems involving
anticipatory decision makers. In simple terms, an anticipatory
agent makes decisions by optimizing a utility involving the
probability of taking future decisions. The main question
addressed is: If multiple anticipatory decision makers interact
sequentially (or a single anticipatory agent acts repeatedly),
how can a global decision maker use these anticipatory
decisions to achieve optimal sequential detection?
Anticipatory
agent 1
Anticipatory
agent 2
Anticipatory
agent 3
· · ·
Global Quickest Change
Decision Maker
{change, continue}
Fig. 1: Quickest Change Detection Problem involving a single
anticipatory agent acting repeatedly (or multiple anticipatory
agents acting sequentially) and a global decision maker. The
anticipatory model for individual decision makers is discussed
in Sec.II and Sec.III and results in time inconsistent decision
making. The interaction of the agents with a global decision
maker to achieve quickest detection is detailed in Sec.IV.
Figure 1 shows our schematic setup. Anticipatory agents
can mimic either strategic human decision makers [1] or an
automated command-control decision system [2]. The antici-
patory agents act sequentially and are affected by the decisions
of previous agents. A global decision maker monitors the
decisions of these anticipatory agents. How can the global
decision maker use the local decisions from these anticipatory
agents to decide when a change has occurred in the underlying
state of nature? The goal of the global decision maker is
to achieve quickest change detection, namely, minimize the
Kolmogorov-Shiryaev criterion involving the false alarm and
decision delay penalty.
2A. Anticipatory Decision Making
Anticipatory decision making has applications in human-
sensor, human-robot and command-control systems [2]. Here
we outline two signal processing centric applications.
(i) Level 3 Situation Awareness. In defense based command-
control systems, Level 3 Situation Awareness (SA) [3] involves
the ability to project implications of future actions (plans).
Level 3 SA [4] is achieved through knowledge of the status
and dynamics of Levels 1 and 2 SA, and then extrapolating
this information forward in time (as an anticipatory reward
involving probabilities of future actions) to determine how it
will affect future decisions/plans [3]. Prediction is concerned
with guessing future states based on extensive training; in
contrast, anticipatory decision making [5] involves preparing
to respond to previously not seen scenarios. [6] shows that
many command and control systems overestimate their abili-
ties to react. Anticipatory decision making involves the ability
to prepare, and not just the ability to predict future states.
Indeed over preparation with a predicted set of scenarios may
reduce capacity for anticipation and adaptation [5].
(ii) Human decision makers. In behavioral economics, Caplin
& Leahy [1] propose a remarkable model for anticipatory
human decision making via a horizon-2 dynamic decision
process: the first stage involves choosing an action to minimize
an anticipatory psychological reward (involving the proba-
bilities of choosing actions at stage 2), while at the second
stage the agent realizes its actual reward. Such anticipatory
models mimic important features of human decision making:
(i) Extensive studies in psychology, neuroscience [7], [8], [9]
show that humans are anticipation-driven agents, and that even
simple decisions involve sophisticated multi-stage planning.
(ii) Anticipatory agents act to reduce anxiety. [10] presented
experimental results where people chose a larger electric shock
than waiting anxiously for a smaller shock. (iii) Anticipative
agents may choose to deliberately avoid information. [11]
reports that giving patients more information before a stressful
medical procedure raised their anxiety.
B. Anticipatory Decision Making Yields Time Inconsistency
An important aspect of anticipatory decision making is
time inconsistency. The dependence of the current reward
on future plans results in a deviation between planning and
execution. This phenomenon is called time-inconsistency1 [12]
and Bellman’s principle of optimality no longer holds. Time
inconsistency results in the planning fallacy of Kahneman &
Tversky [13]: people tend to underestimate the time required to
complete a future task. Compared to rational agents, optimistic
agents take higher risk of making the wrong decision but
have higher anticipatory reward. [14] show that it is opti-
mal for agents with anticipatory reward to take irrational
beliefs (referred to as subjective beliefs) deliberately. This
explains the optimistic planning fallacy, in which people tend
to overestimate future rewards. As will be discussed below,
the appropriate concept of optimality for time-inconsistent
problems is the subgame Nash equilibrium.
1In game-theoretic terms, time-inconsistency arises when the optimal policy
to the current multi-stage decision problem is sub-game imperfect.
C. Quickest Detection with Anticipatory Agents
Having motivated anticipatory decision making, we turn to
the second main idea of the paper, namely, quickest change
detection by a global decision maker which uses the decisions
of anticipatory agents (local decision makers); see Fig.1. There
are two general formulations of quickest detection. In the first
formulation, the change point is an unknown deterministic
time [15]. The second formulation (considered in this paper)
is Bayesian; the change time is specified by a prior [16], [17].
We start by outlining important classes of applications.
The first class of examples involves anticipatory situation
awareness (SA) in a team setting [18]. For example, [19]
introduced a situational adapting system to assess team SA for
fighter pilots based on information fusion. Suppose individual
SA systems monitor an enemy target or enemy radar (state).
Given noisy measurements of the state, each SA system
(equipped with a Bayesian tracker) makes decisions about the
threat and relays these decisions to subsequent SA systems
in the team. A global decision maker (supervisory system)
monitors these decisions to assess overall threat level. How
can the global decision maker detect a sudden change in the
threat? Such a change is reflective of the enemy target making
purposeful maneuvers; or the enemy radar switching modes
between search, acquisition or track.
A second class of examples involve social media based
decision making such as media based accommodation systems.
Individual anticipatory agents make local decisions sequen-
tially whether to rent a property; these decisions are affected
by the reviews (decisions) of previous agents. The global
decision maker (e.g. Airbnb) monitors these local decisions.
How can the global decision maker detect if there is a sudden
change in the demand for a specific accommodation due to the
presence of a new competitor? The supplementary document
discusses this example further with a detailed analysis.
A related example arises in the measurement of the adoption
of a new product using a micro-blogging platform like Twitter.
The adoption of the technology diffuses through the market
but its effects can only be observed through the tweets of
select individuals of the population. These selected individuals
interact and learn from the decisions (tweeted sentiments) of
other members. Suppose the state of nature suddenly changes
due to a sudden market shock or presence of a new competitor.
The goal for a market analyst is to detect this change.
The third example involves human-sensor interface systems,
where anticipatory human decision makers are equipped with
sensing/computing devices. The sensing device observes the
state in noise. The computing device evaluates the posterior
distribution and provides the agent with these probabilities.
The agent (human) then makes anticipatory decisions. The
aim is to devise a change detection algorithm that compensates
for the anticipatory human decision maker. Such schemes are
studied extensively in situation assessment of pilots [20] and
validated based on simulations involving pilots performing
a landing approach into an airport. Other examples include
assistive care for the dementia [21], [22] where a machine
monitors human decisions (activities) for changes in routine
behavior indicating sudden onset of memory impairment.
3belief pi
φ∗(pi)
(a) Classical
belief pi
φ∗(pi)
cont
stop
(b) With anticipatory agents
Fig. 2: Optimal Quickest Change Detection Policy φ∗ as a
function of Bayesian belief pi. In classical quickest detection,
the stopping set is convex (connected). In comparison, for
quickest detection with anticipatory agents (this paper), the
stopping set is nonconvex (disconnected) as indicated in red.
D. Main Results
Sec.II reviews time inconsistent sequential decision prob-
lems and the framework for anticipatory decision making as a
2-stage stochastic optimization problem. Due to the time in-
consistency of the decision problem, the appropriate notion of
optimality is the subgame Nash equilibrium policy. In Sec.III,
our main contribution is to introduce sufficient conditions on
the anticipatory model so that the Nash equilibrium has a
useful structure; see Theorem 1. This structure reveals several
interesting features about anticipatory decision making.
Sec.IV formulates the quickest change detection protocol
involving multiple anticipatory agents where a global decision
maker uses the decisions of the anticipatory decision makers
to decide if a state has changed. The optimal policy that
minimizes the Kolmogorov-Shiryaev criterion is formulated
as the solution of a stochastic dynamic programming problem.
Then Sec.V characterizes the structure of the Bayesian belief
updates and achievable cost of the quickest detector with-
out brute force computations. It derives important structural
properties of the Bayesian updates of the local and global
decision makers (Theorem 2 and Theorem 3), constructs a
lower bound for the optimal cost incurred using Blackwell
dominance (Theorem 4), and presents numerical examples of
the unusual structure of the optimal quickest change policy
(non-convex stopping region).
In classical quickest detection, [23], [16], the optimal policy
has a threshold structure: when the posterior probability of
change exceeds a threshold, it is optimal to declare a change;
see Fig.2a. The stopping set (set of posteriors probabilities
where it is optimal to declare change) is convex. In quickest
detection with anticipatory agents (this paper), the remarkable
feature is that the stopping set is disconnected, see Fig.2b. One
sees the counter-intuitive property: the optimal detection policy
switches from announce change to announce no change as the
posterior probability of a change increases! Thus making a
global decision as to whether a change has occurred based on
local decisions of interacting agents is non-trivial; see also [24]
for a careful analysis in terms of information structures in
decentralized decision making.
E. Perspective
To give additional perspective on the main results discussed
above, we now briefly discuss interesting insights regarding
anticipative decision makers in a quickest change framework.
1. Social Learning. The anticipatory model used in this
paper is from [1]; see also [14], [25]. This generalizes classical
social learning models that have been studied extensively in
sociology, economics and signal processing [26], [27], [28],
[29]. Classical social learning assumes that agents make one-
shot (myopic) decisions to maximize their expected utility. The
behavioral economics models considered here are useful gen-
eralizations of social learning since they involve multi-stage
planning; as mentioned earlier, even simple human decisions
involve multi-stage planning with time-inconsistency.
Our sequential framework of multiple decision makers is
similar to team decision theory [30], [31], [32]; the key
difference being time inconsistency.
2. How un-informed local decision makers affect global
decision making? In order to optimize its change detection
policy, the global decision maker must interpret decisions of
the local decision makers, knowing that the local decision
makers are anticipatory and that they use decisions from
previous agents. A well known characteristic of this sequential
multiagent framework is that agents herd - they ignore their
own observations and parrot decisions of previous agents.
The multi-threshold structure of the global decision maker’s
optimal policy (Figure 2b) can be interpreted as saying that
the global decision maker acts in a non-trivial manner to
compensate for the poorly informed local decision makers. In
comparison, the classical threshold policy (Figure 2a) results
when the local decision makers are well informed (exchange
their posterior distributions rather than anticipatory actions).
3. Change Blindness. The multi-threshold change detection
policy in Fig.2b can be interpreted as a form of change
blindness, namely people fail to detect surprisingly large
changes to scenes [33]. Even though the posterior probability
of a change is higher than a change threshold, the optimal
behavior indicated is to detect no change.
4. Deliberate Avoidance of Information. Theorem 1 in
Sec.III shows that the subgame Nash equilibrium at time 1
has a bang-bang structure. It justifies the observation [1] that
agents with anticipatory emotions may choose to deliberately
avoidance of information. As mentioned earlier, [11] reports
that giving some patients more information before a stressful
medical procedure raised their anxiety.2
Finally, we emphasize that humans likely do not solve time
inconsistent decision processes to make decisions; even gradu-
ate students and professors struggle with such formalisms! The
time inconsistent behavioral economics models in [1], [14],
[25] are widely used because they provide generative models
for the peculiarities of anticipatory human decision making.
F. Organization
The paper is organized into three inter-related parts:
1) Part 1 deals with anticipatory models for a single deci-
sion maker and characterizes the Nash equilibrium.
2) Part 2 of the paper deals with quickest change detection
with a team of anticipatory decision makers.
3) Supplementary Material (separate submitted document)
contains proofs of theorems and a detailed tutorial exam-
ple of anticipatory decision making in social media.
2[9] shows that humans selectively treat the opportunity to gain knowledge
about future favorable outcomes, but not unfavorable outcomes.
4Part 1. Anticipatory Models and Nash Equi-
librium
Sec.II formulates anticipatory decision making. Sec.III char-
acterizes the structure of the Nash equilibrium with examples.
II. ANTICIPATORY DECISION MAKING
This section defines time inconsistent decision problems
and reviews the widely cited behavioral economics model [1]
for human decision making with anticipatory feelings. This
model will be used in Sec.IV to formulate our human sensor
interactive quickest change detection problem.
A. Time Inconsistent Sequential Decision Problems
We start with a brief discussion of time inconsistent decision
problems; see [12] for an exposition. Let {sk, k = 1, . . . , N}
denote a controlled Markov chain evolving on a finite time
horizon size N . The initial distribution for s1 is denoted as
pi1. Let µk : sk → ak denote a (possibly randomized) decision
policy that maps the state sk to an action ak at time k. For
n = 1, 2, . . . , N , define the expected utility-to-go
Jn(sn,µn:N ) = Eµ
{ N∑
k=n
rn,k
(
sn, sk, µk(sk)
)}
(1)
The aim is to compute the policy sequence
argmax
µ
Jn(sn,µn:N ). As the reward rn,k depends on
n and k, and also sn, sk, this optimization problem is time
inconsistent since the principle of optimality (Bellman’s
dynamic programming equation) does not hold; see [12].
1) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria: As discussed in [12],
an appropriate method of “solving” a time inconsistent prob-
lem is in game-theoretic terms.3
1) Given state sN = s, player N chooses policy
µ∗N (s) = argmax
aN
JN (s,µ1:N−1, aN) (2)
This yields the value function VN = JN (s,µ1:N−1, µ
∗
N ).
2) Given sN−1 = s, and that player N is using policy µ
∗
N ,
player N − 1 chooses policy
µ∗N−1(s) = argmax
aN−1
JN−1(s,µ1:N−2, aN−1, µ
∗
N )
VN−1(s) = JN−1(s,µ1:N−2, µ
∗
N−1, µ
∗
N ) (3)
3) Proceed by backward induction to compute policy µ∗1.
The above procedure is called the extended Bellman equation
in [12]. The sequence of policies µ∗ = (µ∗1, . . . , µ
∗
N ), consti-
tutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; see [12] for details.
2) Remarks: (i) As might be expected, for the time con-
sistent case where rn,k(sn, sk, ak) = rk(sk, ak) in (1), the
extended Bellman’s equation becomes the standard Bellman’s
dynamic programming equation.
(ii) For the time inconsistent case, neither the Nash equilibrium
µ
∗ nor its value Jn(µ
∗) are unique. This is in contrast to time
consistent dynamic programming where the optimal policy
may not be unique but the optimal value is always unique.
3The following intuitive argument from [12] is helpful: Looking to maxi-
mize Jn(s,µ) over the class of policies restricted to [n,N ], a player at time
n would like in principle to maximize Jn(s,µ) over µn, . . . , µN . But the
player at time n can only choose the policy µn - so the maximization is not
possible. Instead of looking for optimal feedback laws, in a time inconsistent
problem one considers the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
B. Anticipatory Model of Caplin & Leahy [1]
We now review the time inconsistent model for anticipatory
human decision making in Caplin & Leahy’s seminal pa-
per [1]. Their model uses the terminology of temporal lotteries
in dynamic choice theory [34]. We translate their model to a
more familiar Markov decision process framework. While the
complex notation below is unavoidable, the final outcome is a
time inconsistent problem of the form (1) with horizonN = 2.
A key step in the formulation below is the anticipatory l state
(5) at time 1 which depends on the probability of future actions
(at time 2); this gives the model its anticipatory property.
1) Anticipatory Model and Time Inconsistency: The antici-
patory decision model in [1] comprises two time steps indexed
by k = 1, 2. The physical state sk ∈ S, k = 1, 2, where S
denotes the state space, evolves with Markov transition kernel
p(s2|s1). Let a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2 denote the actions
taken by the agent (human) at time 1 and 2. These actions are
determined by the non-randomized policies µ1 and µ2 where
a1 = µ1(s1), a2 = µ2(s2, a1). (4)
The first key idea in Caplin & Leahy [1] is to define the
anticipatory (psychological) state zk, k = 1, 2:
z1 = φ
(
s1, a1, {p(a2 = a|s1, a1, µ2), a ∈ A2}
)
,
z2 = (s2, a2, a1),
(5)
for some pre-defined function φ. In [1], zk models the human
decision maker’s state of mind (anxiety). However, more gen-
erally, zk can model any anticipatory plan, such as for example
in situation awareness systems. Note that the anticipatory state
z1 depends on the set of conditional probabilities {p(a2 =
a|s1, a1, µ2), a ∈ A2}. These conditional probabilities model
anticipation (anxiety)4 of the decision maker at time 1 about
possible actions it can make at time 2. The anticipation is
resolved at time 2 when physical state s2 is observed and all
uncertainty is resolved; hence the anticipatory l state z2 only
contains physical state s2 and realized action a2.
The next key idea in [1] is that the anticipatory agent makes
decisions by maximizing the 2-stage anticipatory utility
sup
µ1,µ2
J(µ1, µ2) = Eµ1,µ2{r1(z1) + r2(z2)} (6)
Here rk : zk → IR, k = 1, 2 denote the reward functions. The
2-stage anticipatory utility, called psychological utility in [1],
(6) looks just like a standard time separable utility except for
the presence of the anxiety term {p(a2 = a|s1, a1, µ2), a ∈
A2} in r1(z1). This µ2 dependency gives rise to time incon-
sistency in decision making. Indeed (6) is a special case of
the general time inconsistent formulation (1) with
r2,2 = r2(s2, a2, a1), (7)
r1,1 + r1,2 = r1
(
φ(s1, a1, {p(a2 = a|s1, a1, µ2), a ∈ A})
)
4As discussed in [1], introducing anticipatory emotions explains why
changing an outcome from zero to a small positive number can have a large
effect on anticipation. Human decision makers are sensitive to the possibility
rather than probability of negative outcomes [35]. A terrorist attack (unlikely
event) worries people a lot more than a car crash (high probability event).
52) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Caplin & Leahy [1]
‘solve’ the time inconsistent decision problem (6) using the
extended Bellman equation described in Sec.II-A. Indeed, the
optimal policy at time 2 simply follows from (2) with N = 2:
µ∗2(s2, a1) = argmax
a2
r2(s2, a2) (8)
Note that by definition (4), µ∗2 depends on a1 and s2.
To specify the optimal policy at time 1, we first introduce
the following compact notation. Define the measure
λa
defn
=
∫
S
I(s2 : µ
∗
2(s2, a1) = a) p(s2|s1) ds2,
λ = {λa, a ∈ A2}
(9)
At time 1, due to time inconsistency, the agent chooses a time
consistent policy µ∗1 based on extended Bellman equation (3):
µ∗1(s1) = argmax
a1
J1(s, a1, µ
∗
2),
V1(s, a1) = max
a1
J1(s, a1, µ
∗
2),
J1(s, a1, µ
∗
2) = r1
(
φ(s1, a1, λ)
)
+
∫
S
r2
(
s2, µ
∗
2(s2, a1)
)
p(s2|s1)ds2
(10)
Recall p(s2|s1) is the transition kernel of the physical state.
Remarks: (i) We can express (10) in compact notation as
µ∗1(s1) = argmax
a1
{r1
(
φ(s1, a1, λ)
)
+ Eλ{r2
(
s2, a2, a1)}
(11)
which is the same as the master equation [1, Eq.2] since
Eλ{r2
(
s2, a2, a1)} =
∫
A2
∫
S
r2(s2, a, a1)λa ds2da
=
∫
A2
∫
S
r2
(
s2, a, a1) I(
(
a = µ∗2(s2, a1)
)
p(s2|s1)ds2da
(ii) The anticipatory (psychological) state z1 in (5) consisted of
the set of conditional probabilities {p(a2 = a|s1, a1, µ2), a ∈
A2}. More generally, one can formulate the anticipatory state
with these conditional probabilities replaced by
{E{Ψ(a2 = a, s2)|s1, a1, µ2}, a ∈ A2} (12)
for some pre-defined function Ψ. As an example (which we
will elaborate on in the supplementary material)
z1 = max{p(a2 = 1|s1, a1, µ2),E{s2I(a2 = 2)|s1, a1, µ2)}
(iii) We mentioned previously that the subgame Nash equi-
librium approach to time inconsistency disregards the fact
that µ∗2 is no longer optimal at time 1. Another insightful
way of viewing this is that the estimated anticipatory reward
r1
(
φ(s1, a1, λ)
)
requires the agent to extrapolate what might
happen at the second stage, plans are not optimal once an
action is taken. As an example, people tend to assign higher
future workload than what they will actually take on.
Summary. The key point in anticipatory decision making
is the presence of probabilities of choosing future actions in
the current reward, as depicted in the anticipatory state (5).
As a result, maximizing the 2-stage anticipatory utility (6)
is a time inconsistent problem. The anticipatory decision
maker chooses actions a1, a2 according to policies µ
∗
1 in (10)
and µ∗2 in (8); these policies constitute a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. Indeed (11) corresponds to the key master
equation (2) in [1]. The paper [1] has received significant
attention in behavioral economics (mindful economics [7]),
neuroscience and psychology [9].
III. CHARACTERIZING THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM POLICY
OF ANTICIPATORY DECISION MAKER AND EXAMPLES
The previous section gave a general setup of the antici-
patory decision making model and associated subgame Nash
equilibrium policy. However, the Nash equilibrium (11) is the
solution of the extended Bellman equation (integral equation)
and is difficult to compute in general. In this section, our
main contribution is to make specific assumptions on the
anticipatory model to give a useful characterization of the
Nash equilibrium. Specifically, these assumptions result in
a bang-bang and threshold structure for the subgame Nash
equilibrium policy (Theorem 1 below). This structural result
is then illustrated by an example involving situation awareness.
Bayesian parametrization of transition kernel and reward
Recall r2 is the reward at time 2; see (5), (6). In the rest
of the paper, we will parametrize r2 and the transition kernel
p(s2|s1) by a Bayesian parameter. The parameterized reward
and transition kernel are constructed as follows: Define the
reward r2(s2, a2, a1, x) and transition kernel p(s2|s1, x) which
now also depends on a state of nature (ground truth) x. The
process x ∈ X = {1, 2, . . . ,m} will be formally defined in
Sec.IV to model change in quickest detection. Then define the
parametrized reward rη,2 and transition kernel pη(s2|s1) as
rη,2(s2, a2, a1) =
∑
x∈X
r2(s2, a2, a1, x) η(x)
pη(s2|s1) =
∑
x∈X
p(s2|s1, x) η(x)
(13)
Here η is an m-dimensional Bayesian belief (posterior) vector
that lies in the unitm−1 dimensional simplex Π of probability
mass functions: η = [η(1), . . . η(m)]′ ∈ Π, where
Π = {η : η(i) ∈ [0, 1],
m∑
i=1
η(i) = 1} (14)
The posterior η (which will be formally defined in (20)) will be
used in the quickest change detection formulation in Sec.IV.
For the purposes of this section, η is simply a fixed probability
vector in the two-stage anticipatory decision model.
A. Structural Characterization of Nash equilibrium
With rη,2 defined in (13), for notational convenience, define
∆η(s2, a1) = rη,2(s2, 2, a1)− rη,2(s2, 1, a1) (15)
We make the following assumptions on the anticipatory
decision model of Sec.II-B:
(A1) The action spaces are A1 = [0, 1], A2 = {1, 2}. Recall
a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2.
The state space is S = [0, 1]. Recall s1, s2 ∈ S.
6(A2) rη,2(s2, a2, a1) is convex in a1.
(A3) ∆η(s2, a1) defined in (15) is increasing in s2. Equiva-
lently, rη,2(s2, a2, a1) is supermodular in (s2, a2).
(A4) The solution s∗2(a1) of ∆η(s2, a1) = 0 exists for a1 ∈
(0, 1) and is continuously differentiable on (0, 1).
(A5)
∂∆η
∂a1
∂2∆η
∂s2∂a1
−
∂∆η
∂s2
∂2∆η
∂a21
≥ 0
(A6) The anticipatory reward is r1(z1) = βz1 where β > 0
and the psychological state (see (12)) is
z1 = max{E{Ψ(a2 = a, s2)|s1, a1, µ2}, a ∈ A2}
(A7) Ψ(a2 = 1, s2) pη(s2|s1) is increasing in s2
Ψ(a2 = 2, s2) pη(s2|s1) is decreasing in s2.
The following structural result characterizes the structure of
the subgame Nash equilibrium. For subsequent reference, we
will denote the explicit dependence of µ∗1 and µ
∗
2 on Bayesian
parameter η (see (14)) as µ∗1,η and µ
∗
2,η.
Theorem 1. Consider the anticipatory decision model of
Sec.II-B with action and state spaces specified by (A1). Then
1) Under (A3), (A4), the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
policy µ∗2 specified by (8) has a threshold structure:
µ∗2,η(s2, a1) =
{
1 if s2 ≤ s
∗
2,η(a1)
2 s2 > s
∗
2,η(a1)
(16)
for some threshold state s∗2,η(a1) ∈ [0, 1] which depends
on the Bayesian parameter η.
2) Under (A4), (A5), threshold state s∗2,η(a1) is convex in a1.
3) Under (A2)-(A7), the utility-to-go J1(s, a1, µ
∗
2) defined in
(10) is convex in a1. Therefore, the subgame Nash equi-
librium policy µ∗1 has the following bang-bang
5 structure:
µ∗1,η(s1) =
{
1 if β > β∗
0 otherwise
(17)
for some positive constant β∗.
Remarks. The proof is in the supplementary document.
(i) Discussion of Assumptions. Supermodularity assumptions
such as (A3) are widely used for scheduling policies in
signal processing/communications. By Topkis theorem [36],
supermodularity (A3) implies Nash policy µ∗2(s2, a1) is non-
decreasing in s2 for fixed a1. This together with (A4) implies
that µ∗2 has a threshold structure (16) wrt s2 (see proof).
Assumptions (A2)-(A7) imply that the anticipatory state z1
is convex in a1. Since a convex function is maximized at
its end points, the bang-bang structure (17) for µ∗1 follows.
Let us dive deeper into these assumptions. Statement 2, is
equivalent to showing convexity in a1 of the solution s
∗
2(a1)
of the algebraic equation ∆η(s2, a1) = 0. It is here that (A5)
along with continuous differentiablity in (A4) is used. Showing
convexity of the implicit solution to an algebraic equation
5The phrase “bang-bang controller” comes from classical optimal control
theory. It characterizes a control policy with continuous-valued actions that
switches between two extremes.
dates back to [37]. (A4) can be relaxed based on the classical
implicit function theorem [38]; see supplementary document.
Finally, the convexity of rewards (A2) and assumption
(A7) together with Statement 2 imply that the anticipatory
(psychological) state z1 is convex in a1.
(ii) Deliberate Avoidance of Information. Suppose a1 de-
notes a non-refundable financial deposit made by the agent at
time 1 in anticipation of choosing action a2 = 1 at time 2.
Due to the bang-bang structure of (17) the agent makes a
full deposit a1 = 1 if β > β
∗. Yet this full non-refundable
deposit does not guarantee that the agent will choose a2 = 1
since if s2 > s
∗
2(a1), then the agent will choose a2 = 2.
Thus the agent would like to avoid observing s2. There is an
elegant interpretation of this in [1], namely, the agent might
deliberately choose not to observe the state s2 in order not to
lose the deposit. “In this manner, anticipatory emotions may
rationalize the deliberate avoidance of information” [1].
B. Example. Anticipatory Situation Awareness (SA)
We now discuss an anticipatory decision making example
involving Level 3 SA. The example will be developed further
in the context of quickest time change detection in Sec.IV.
1) Model: The physical states s1 and s2 denote the prob-
ability that the threat level of a target (or group of targets)
exceeds a threshold, at stages 1 and 2. (In Sec.IV-A we
consider a team SA framework over multiple stages.)
Regarding the actions, at the first stage the SA system
chooses action a1 ∈ [0, 1] which denotes fraction of resources
devoted to tracking a specific target. At the second stage, the
SA makes the final choice of whether to take active measures
(e.g. intercept the target) or choose passive measures (continue
to track it), i.e., a2 ∈ A2 = {active, passive}.
Next we model the anticipatory decision making of the SA
system. We choose the anticipatory reward to reflect beliefs
about threat levels that will be derived in choosing respectively,
active and passive. We choose the anticipatory state z1 at
time 1 as the conditional probabilities (see (5))
z1 = max{6 p(a2 = active, threat2 = high|a1, µ2),
4 p(a2 = passive|a1, µ2)} (18)
(We allocate numerical values to make the example more
readable.) So the anticipatory reward increases with the SA’s
plan to use an active measure if the threat is high.
We now construct the rewards r1, r2 defined in (6).
1) Choosing action a1 expends 2 a1 resources on planning
for active measures at time 2. If passive is chosen at
time 2, then the resources of 2 a1 are wasted (lost).
2) The reward accrued by choosing active when the threat
level is s2 is 6s2η; the reward for choosing passive is
fixed at 4. Here6 η ∈ [0, 1] is the posterior probability
that the threat level with action active is high given
information from sensing functionalities.
Based on the above description, the rewards are
r1 = βz1, rη,2(s2, a2 = active, a1) = 6 s2η − 2 a1,
rη,2(s2, a2 = passive, a1) = 4
6We assume η = [η(1), η(2)]′ is a 2-dimensional probability vector, i.e.,
m = 2 in (14). For notational convenience, we refer to η(2) as η.
72) Structure of Nash Equilibrium: For simplicity, assume
s2 is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. For the above example,
we can verify Assumptions (A1)-(A7) hold and therefore
Theorem 1 holds. Specifically, (A1) holds by formulation;
(A2) holds trivially since rη,2 is linear in a1; (A3) holds since
rη,2(s2, a2 = passive, a1) is independent of s2; (A4) and
(A5) hold trivially since ∆η is linear in s2 and a1; (A6) holds
by construction since it is easily shown that for optimal policy
µ∗2, z1 = 4 p(a2 = passive|a1, µ
∗
2). Finally, (A7) holds since
p(s2) is the uniform density by assumption.
3) Consequences: Theorem 1 implies µ∗2 has a threshold
structure (16), and µ∗1 has a bang-bang structure (17). The
bang-bang structure (17), represents a dilemma to the SA
system. The SA system fully utilizes its resources, a1 = 1
towards plan active if β > β∗. Yet this does not guarantee
that the SA system will choose a2 = active since if
s2 > s
∗
2(a1), then the agent will choose a2 = passive.
Thus a human-in the-loop in the SA system might deliberately
choose not to observe the state s2 in order not to lose the effort
invested at stage 1.
The supplementary document gives a detailed example in
social media accommodation with a similar dilemma due to
the bang-bang Nash equilibrium structure: avoid information
at stage 2 so as not to lose the full deposit made at stage 1.
Part 2. Quickest Change Detection for Team
Anticipatory Decision Makers
Part 1 of the paper described how a single anticipatory
agent makes decisions over a two-period time horizon. In
Part 2, we consider a team of such anticipatory agents (or
equivalently, a single agent that acts multiple times). These
agents interact with each other sequentially and also with a
global decision maker to achieve quickest change detection.
Each agent observes the state of nature (Markov chain) in
noise and makes local anticipatory decisions as described in
Sec.II-B. How can a global decision maker use these local
decisions to detect a change in the state of nature? Specifically
the aim is to achieve quickest change detection by minimizing
the Kolmogorov-Shiryaev criterion (defined in (27) below)
which involves the false alarm and decision delay.
IV. ANTICIPATORY QUICKEST CHANGE DETECTION
Notation. Since we now consider sequential interaction of
anticipatory decision makers, we modify the notation of Sec.III
to the sequential setup as follows:
• The process {xn} defined below models the change event.
• Each anticipatory agent acts in a predetermined sequential
order7 indexed by n = 1, 2, . . ..
• The physical states s1, s2 encountered by agent n are now
denoted by sn,1, sn,2.
• Anticipatory decisions a1, a2 taken by agent n are de-
noted as an,1, an,2.
• The Bayesian belief parameter η of agent n is ηn.
• Recall due to the bang-bang structure (17) of the optimal
policy, a1,n is independent of sn,1. Also from (16),
7Equivalently, a single agent acts repeatedly and chooses its local decision
using the current public belief.
an,2 depends on sn,2 and not sn,1. So for notational
convenience we denote sn,2 as sn. The physical state
process {sn, n ≥ 1} on state space S is Markovian with
transition density p(sn+1|sn, xn), see (13).
State of nature {xn} jump changes at time τ
0
Anticipatory
agent n
Global Decision Maker
sn
yn
un, n = 1, 2, . . .
anpin−1
Fig. 3: Quickest Change Detection Problem involving multiple
anticipatory local decision makers and a global decision maker.
(i) Anticipatory local decision maker n = 1, 2 . . . observes state
of nature xn in noise as yn and receives public belief pin−1 from
previous agent. It then makes anticipatory decision an.
(ii) The global decision maker uses an to update
the public belief pin and makes decision un ∈
{1(stop and declare change), 2(continue)}.
Model. In Bayesian quickest detection, the change event
is modeled by a random process{xn, n ≥ 0} that starts at
state 2 at time 0 and jumps to state 1 at some random time
τ0. We assume that τ0 is geometrically distributed with mean
1/(1− θ), for some prespecified θ ∈ [0, 1).
Equivalently, the state of nature {xn} is a 2-state Markov
chain with initial distribution pi0 = [0 1]
′ where pi0(x) =
P(x0 = x), x ∈ {1, 2} and absorbing transition matrix
P =
[
1 0
1− θ θ
]
(19)
with change time τ0 = inf{n : xn = 1} Clearly the transition
matrix P implies that E{τ0} = 1/(1− θ).
Quickest detection involves detecting the change time τ0
with minimal cost. The multiagent formulation considered here
comprises of interacting local decision makers (anticipatory
agents) and a global decision maker:
1) The state-of-nature {xn, n ≥ 0} affects the transition
kernel of the physical state process {sn, n ≥ 1}; see (13).
2) Each anticipatory agent n acts sequentially indexed by
n = 1, 2, . . .. Agent n observes state of nature xn in
noise and makes a local decisions an = (an,1, an,2)
corresponding to actions a1, a2 in Sec.III; see footnote 7.
3) Based on the history of local actions a1, . . . , an, the
global decision maker chooses action
un ∈ {1 (stop and announce change), 2 (continue)}
Define the public belief pin and private belief ηn at time n as
the posterior distributions initialized with η0 = pi0 =
[
0 1
]′
:
pin(x) = P(xn = x|a1, . . . , an), x = 1, 2.
ηn(x) = P(xn = x|a1, . . . , an−1, yn),
(20)
Note η = [1− η(2), η(2)]′ and pi = [1− pi(2), pi(2)]′; they lie
in the one dimensional simplex Π = [0, 1].
8We are now ready to describe the multiagent quickest
detection protocol, see also Figure 3 for a schematic setup:
Protocol 1. Multiagent Bayesian Quickest Detection
1) Local anticipatory decision maker n
a) Obtain public belief pin−1 from global decision maker.
b) The sensing functionality records private noisy obser-
vation yn ∈ Y of state xn with conditional density
Bx,y = p(yn = y|xn = x) (21)
c) Private Belief. The computing functionality of the
agent evaluates the private belief
ηn = T (pin−1, yn) where, T (pi, y) =
By P
′pi
σ(pi, y)
, (22)
σ(pi, y) = 1′ByP
′pi, By = diag(B1,y, B2,y)
d) Local decision. The state-of-nature {xn, n ≥ 0}
affects the transition kernel of the physical state process
{sn, n ≥ 1} (13). The agent uses ηn, sn to make
anticipatory decisions an = (an,1, an,2) via (17), (16).
2) Global decision maker. Based on the decisions an of local
decision maker n, the global decision maker:
a) Updates the public belief from pin−1 to pin as
pin = T¯ (pin−1, an, sn) (23)
T¯ (pi, a, s) =
Rpia (s)P
′pi
σ¯(pi, a, s)
, σ¯(pi, a, s) = 1′Rpia (s)P
′pi
where Rpia (s) = diag(R
pi
1,a(s), R
pi
2,a(s)),
Rpix,a(s) = P(an = a|xn = x, pin−1, sn = s) (24)
The action probabilities Rpix,a are computed as
Rpix,a(s) =
∫
Y
I(µ∗2,T (pi,y)(s, an,1) = a)Bx,ydy (25)
Recall µ∗2,η is the local decision maker’s subgame Nash
equilibrium policy (16).
b) Chooses global action un using optimal policy φ
∗:
un = φ
∗(pin, sn) ∈ {1 (stop), 2 (continue)}. (26)
c) If un = 2, then set n to n+ 1 and go to Step 1.
If un = 1, then stop and announce change.
In (26), the optimal stationary policy φ∗ of the global de-
cision maker is defined as the minimizer of the Kolmogorov–
Shiryaev criterion for detection of disorder [23]:
Jφ∗(pi, s) = inf
φ
Jφ(pi, s),
Jφ(pi, s) = dEφ{(τ − τ
0)+}+ f Pφ(τ < τ
0).
(27)
Here τ = inf{n : un = 1} is the time at which the
global decision maker announces the change. The parameters
d and f specify the delay penalty and false alarm penalty,
respectively. So waiting too long to announce a change incurs
a delay penalty d at each time instant after the system has
changed, while declaring a change before it happens, incurs
a false alarm penalty f . Pφ and Eφ are the probability
measure and expectation of the evolution of the local decisions,
observations and Markov state which are strategy dependent.
In (27), pi denotes the initial distribution of the Markov chain
x and s is the initial state of the physical state process.
A. Example. Change Detection in Team Situation Awareness
Sec.III-B described an individual anticipatory situation
awareness (SA) system. In complex environments individual
SA is no longer adequate. We consider here team-level SA
[18]. For example, [19] introduced a situational adapting sys-
tem to assess team SA for fighter pilots based on information
fusion. To achieve team SA, individual pilots need to develop
and retain their own SA while performing the task, share their
SA and notice relevant activities of other members in the team.
In the simplest sequential framework of Team SA, we have
the setup of Protocol 1 where:
1) The underlying state of nature xn denotes the enemy
target or radar state that is monitored by the SA system.
2) yn are measurements of the enemy’s state xn.
3) pin−1 is the enemy’s belief p(xn−1|a1, . . . , an−1) ob-
tained from a Bayesian tracking algorithm.
4) The physical state sn is the probability of threat. Its
transition kernel is modulated by ground truth xn (13).
5) Individual agents in the team SA agent make decisions
an,1, an,2 according to Protocol 1 and relay them to
subsequent SA systems in the team.
Then quickest detection is motivated as follows: by monitoring
the decisions {an} of the individual SA systems, how can a
supervisory system to detect if there is a sudden change in the
state {xn}? Such a change is reflective of the enemy target
making purposeful maneuvers; or the enemy radar switching
modes between search, acquisition or track. Since it operates
at a higher level of abstraction, the supervisory system does
have access to the observations yn of individual SA systems.
A similar framework in social media accommodation is
discussed in the supplementary document. Given the sequence
of decisions {an}, the global decision maker (e.g. Airbnb)
wishes to detect if there is a sudden appearance of competition
or sudden change in quality of the accommodation xn. The
physical state sn is the probability of a good review (review
histogram) and its kernel depends on the ground truth xn.
B. Discussion of Protocol 1
1. Sensor-human Interface. Suppose each anticipatory hu-
man decision maker is equipped with a sensing/computing
device that performs Steps 1a to 1c. Specifically, the noisy
observation yn in Step 1b is obtained by a sensor/computing
device which then uses Bayes rule to evaluate the private belief
ηn in Step 1c according to (22). The sensing functionality
then provides ηn to the anticipatory decision maker. Recall
that ηn enters the parametrized rewards of the anticipatory
decision maker as discussed in (14). Finally, the anticipatory
decision maker chooses action an in Step 1d according to the
framework in Sec.III. Thus Step 1 preserves the simplicity of
the anticipatory human decision making model in [1].
2. Global decision maker. Step 2 details the decision making
framework of the global decision maker. The global decision
maker has access to the physical state sn and the actions
an,1, an,2 of the local decision maker. These are used by the
global decision maker in Step 2a to update the public belief
in (23). The action likelihoods in (25) follow from (22):
Rpix,a(s) =
∫
I(µ∗2,η(s, a1,n) = a) p(η|pin−1, y)Bx,y dη dy
9Then in Step 2b, the global decision maker applies the optimal
policy φ∗ to the updated public belief pin, to chooses whether
to continue or stop (announce change).
3. Comparison with Bayesian social learning. Protocol 1
generalizes classical Bayesian social learning [26] in two
ways. First, the public belief update (23) is a generalization
of the Bayesian social learning filter [39], where the local
decision maker is a myopic optimizer (in comparison, we now
have a two-stage anticipatory local decision maker). Second,
the local decision makers operate in closed loop; they are
controlled by the global decision maker as discussed below.
4. Information Structure. Protocol 1 depicts two types of
interactions. Local decision makers learn from previous local
decision makers (as in social learning). Second, the local
decisions an determine the global decisions un.
C. Stochastic Dynamic Programming Formulation of Quickest
Change Detection
The aim of this section is to formulate the global decision
maker’s quickest change detection policy φ∗(pi, s) (defined in
(27)) as the solution of a stochastic dynamic programming
equation. The quickest detection problem (27) is an example
of a stopping-time partially observed Markov decision process
(POMDP) problem with a stationary optimal policy [39].
1) Costs: To present the dynamic programming equation,
we first formulate the false alarm and delay costs incurred by
the global decision maker in terms of the public belief (also
called the information state).
(i) False alarm penalty: If global decision un = 1 (stop)
is chosen at time n, then the protocol terminates. If un =
1 is chosen before the change point τ0, then a false alarm
penalty is incurred. The false alarm event {xn = 2, un = 1}
represents the event that a change is announced before the
change happens at time τ0. The expected false alarm penalty
is f E{I(xn = 2, un = 1)|Gn} where f ≥ 0 and
Gn = σ-algebra generated by (a1, . . . , an) (28)
In terms of public belief, the expected false alarm penalty is
C(pin, un = 1) = f e
′
2pin, where e2 = [0 1]
′. (29)
(ii) Delay cost of continuing: If global decision un = 2 is
taken then Protocol 1 continues to the next time. A delay cost
is incurred when the event {xn = 1, un = 2} occurs, i.e.,
no change is declared at time n, even though the state has
changed at time n. The expected delay cost is dE{I(xn =
1, un = 2)|Gn} where d > 0 denotes the delay cost. In terms
of the public belief, the delay cost is
C(pin, un = 2) = de
′
1pin, where e1 = [1 0]
′. (30)
We can re-express Kolmogorov-Shiryaev criterion (27) as8
Jφ(pi, s) = Eφ{
τ−1∑
n=0
C(pin, 2) + C(piτ , 1)} (31)
8The formal construction is as follows. Let (Ω,F) denote the underlying
measurable space where Ω = (X × U × Y × S)∞ is the product space
endowed the with product topology, and F is the corresponding σ-algebra.
Then for any pi ∈ Π, s ∈ S and policy stationary policy φ, there exists a
unique probability measure Pφ on (Ω,F), see [40]. In (27) and (31), Eφ
denotes the expectation wrt measure Pφ.
where τ = inf{n : un = 1} is adapted to the σ-algebra
Gn. Since C(pi, 1), C(pi, 2) are non-negative and bounded for
pi ∈ Π, stopping is guaranteed in finite time.
2) Bellman’s equation: Consider the costs (29), (30) de-
fined in terms of the public belief pi. Then the optimal
stationary policy φ∗(pi, s) defined in (26), (27). and associated
value function V (pi, s) are the solution of Bellman’s dynamic
programming functional equation [39]
Q(pi, s, 1)
defn
= C(pi, 1),
Q(pi, s, 2)
defn
= C(pi, 2)
+
∫
S
∑
a∈A1×A2
V
(
T¯ (pi, a, s¯), s¯
)
σ¯(pi, a, s¯) p(s¯|s)} ds¯
φ∗(pi, s) = argmin{Q(pi, s, 1), Q(pi, s, 2)},
V(pi, s) = min{Q(pi, s, 1), Q(pi, s, 2)} = J∗φ(pi, s)
(32)
The public belief update T¯ and normalization measure σ¯ were
defined in (23). Recall (26) that un = φ
∗(pin, sn) is the global
decision maker’s action whether to continue or stop.
The goal of the global decision-maker is to solve for the
optimal quickest change policy φ∗ in (32) or equivalently,
determine the optimal stopping set S
S = {pi, s : φ∗(pi, s) = 1} = {pi, s : Q(pi, s, 1) ≤ Q(pi, s, 2)}
(33)
3) Value Iteration Algorithm: The optimal policy φ∗(pi, s)
and value function V(pi, s) can be constructed as the solution
of a fixed point iteration of Bellman’s equation (32) – the
resulting algorithm is called the value iteration algorithm.
The value iteration algorithm proceeds as follows: Initialize
V0(pi, s) = 0 and for iterations k = 1, 2, . . .
Vk+1(pi, s) = min
u∈U
Qk+1(pi, s, u),
φ∗k+1(pi, s) = argmin
u∈U
Qk+1(pi, s, u) pi ∈ Π,
Qk+1(pi, s, 1) = C(pi, 1), Qk+1(pi, s, 2) = C(pi, 2)
+
∫
S
∑
a∈A1×A2
Vk
(
T¯ (pi, s¯, a), s¯
)
σ¯(pi, s¯, a) p(s¯|s)ds¯,
(34)
Let B denote the set of bounded real-valued functions on
Π. For any V , V˜ ∈ B and pi ∈ Π, define the sup-norm
metric sup ‖V(pi, s) − V˜(pi, s)‖, s ∈ S. Since C(pi, 1),
C(pi, 2), pi ∈ Π, are bounded, the value iteration algorithm
(34) generates a sequence of lower semi-continuous value
functions {Vk} ⊂ B that converge pointwise as k → ∞ to
V(pi, s) ∈ B, the solution of Bellman’s equation [41, Prop.1.3,
Chap 3, Vol.2]
Summary. Protocol 1 describes the setup for quickest de-
tection protocol involving anticipative agents acting sequen-
tially. Each local decision maker (agent) n = 1, 2, . . . makes
anticipatory decisions an,1, an,2 according to the framework
in Sec.III. The global decision maker uses these actions to
make decision un = φ
∗(pin, sn) ∈ {1, 2}. The optimal
detection policy φ∗ of the global decision maker satisfies
Bellman’s equation (32) and can be constructed by value
iteration algorithm (34).
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V. STRUCTURAL RESULTS FOR QUICKEST DETECTION
WITH ANTICIPATORY AGENTS
In the previous section, we formulated Bellman’s dynamic
programming equation for the quickest detection policy of the
global decision maker. However, since the belief space Π in
(14) is a unit simplex, the value iteration algorithm (34) does
not directly yield a practical solution for computing stopping
set S since Vk(pi) needs to be evaluated on the continuum
pi ∈ Π. Specifically, in quickest detection, since xk ∈ {1, 2},
the belief space Π is a 1-dimensional simplex comprising 2-
dimensional beliefs of the form pi = [1 − pi(2), pi(2)]′. The
value iteration algorithm can be solved numerically by one-
dimensional grid discretization of Π.
The aim off this section is to characterize the structure
of the belief updates and achievable optimal cost in quickest
detection without brute force computations.
Specifically we discuss 5 important structural results below:
1) The private belief update of individual anticipatory agents
follows simple rules justifying human decision-making.
2) Even though the public belief update depends on the
action probabilities Rpi (24) where pi ∈ Π is continuum,
there are only a finite number of such action probabilities.
3) In stark contrast to classical quickest detection, the value
function (32) in Bellman’s equation for quickest detection
with anticipative agents is not necessarily concave.
4) We give numerical examples of the optimal quickest
detection policy to highlight the unusual structure of
non-convex stopping regions. These illustrate change-
blindness.
5) Finally, by using Blackwell dominance, we show that the
cumulative cost incurred is always larger than classical
quickest change detection.
A. Private Belief Update follows simple monotone rules
As discussed at the beginning of Sec.IV, the agent ei-
ther uses a sensing/computing device to evaluate its private
Bayesian belief or constructs an approximation to the private
belief in order to make an anticipative decision. Below we
show that the Bayesian update for the private belief is mono-
tone in the observation and prior; thus it follows simple rules
and is a useful idealization of human decision making.
Recall Theorem 1 asserted monotonicity of the anticipatory
decision maker’s policy µ∗2,η(s2, a1) wrt physical state s2.
Here we show monotonicity wrt the Bayesian parameter pi
(recall pi is the prior for η in the Bayesian update (22)) and
observation y. We make the following assumptions
(A8) The observation likelihoods Bx,y (21) are TP2 (totally
positive of order 2); that is, Bx¯,yBx,y¯ ≤ Bx,yBx¯,y¯ , x¯ >
x, y¯ > y.
(A9) r2(s2, a2, a1, x) (see (13)) is supermodular in (x, a2), i.e.,
r2(s2, a2, a1, x¯)− r2(s2, a2, a1, x) is increasing in a2.
(A8) is widely studied in monotone decision making; see the
classical paper [42]; numerous examples of noise distributions
are TP2. As described in [43], observation y¯ is said to be more
“favorable news” than observation y if (A8) holds. (A9) is a
supermodularity condition on the rewards; see (A3).
In the theorem below recall that µ∗2,T (pi,y) is the subgame
Nash equilibrium of the local anticipatory decision maker.
Theorem 2. The following properties hold for the anticipatory
action an,2 = µ
∗
2,T (pi,y)(s, an,1) in (16) made by agent n:
1) Under (A8) and (A9), an,2 is increasing and ordinal in
observation y. That is for any monotone function φ, it
follows that φ(an,2) is also increasing in y.
2) Under (A8), µ∗2,T (pi,y)(s, an,1) is increasing in belief pi
with respect to the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR)
stochastic order9 for any observation yn.
We can interpret the above theorem as follows. If anticipa-
tive agent n makes recommendations that are monotone and
ordinal in the observations and monotone in the prior, then they
mimic the Bayesian social learning model. Even if the agent
does not exactly follow a Bayesian social learning model, its
monotone ordinal behavior implies that such a Bayesian model
is a useful idealization. Humans typically make monotone
decisions - the more favorable the private observation, the
higher the recommendation. Humans make ordinal decisions10
since humans tend to think in symbolic ordinal terms.
We now discuss assumption (A9). Denote the reward vector
ra
defn
= [r2(s2, a2 = a, a1, x = 1), . . . , r2(s2, a2 = a, a1, x = m)]
′
Then (A9) is a stronger version of the following more general
single-crossing condition [36]: For y¯ > y
(ra+1 − ra)
′By¯pi ≤ 0 =⇒ (ra+1 − ra)
′Bypi ≤ 0. (35)
This single crossing condition is ordinal, since for any mono-
tone function φ, it is equivalent to
φ((ra+1 − ra)
′By¯pi) ≤ 0 =⇒ φ((ra+1 − ra)
′Bypi) ≤ 0.
B. Structure of Public Belief Update
We assume in this section that the observation space and
action space of the anticipatory agent are Y = {1, . . . , Y },
A2 = {1, 2}. Even though the public belief pi ∈ Π is
continuum, it turns out that there are only Y + 1 possible
distinct action likelihood probability matrices Rpi.
Specially, define the following Y points in the one-
dimensional simplex Π:
pi∗y = {pi : (r1 − r2)
′ByP
′pi = 0}, y = 1, . . . , Y
Note that pi∗y = [1− pi
∗
y(2), piy(2)]
′ depends on a1, s.
Theorem 3. Under (A8), (A9), it follows that
pi∗1(2) ≤ pi
∗
2(2) · · · ≤ pi
∗
Y (2) (36)
Thus the belief space Π = [0, 1] can be partitioned into at
most Y +1 non empty intervals denoted P1, . . . ,PY+1 where
P1 = [0, pi
∗
1(2)],P2 = (pi
∗
1(2), pi
∗
2(2)], . . . ,Py+1 = (pi
∗
Y (2), 1]
(37)
9 Given probability mass functions {pi} and {qi}, i = 1, . . . ,X then p
MLR dominates q if log pi − log pi+1 ≤ log qi − log qi+1.
10Humans typically convert numerical attributes to ordinal scales before
making decisions. For example, it does not matter if the cost of a meal at a
restaurant is $200 or $205; an individual would classify this cost as “high”.
Also credit rating agencies use ordinal symbols such as AAA, AA, A.
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On each such interval, the action likelihood Rpi is a constant
with respect to belief pi. Specifically, for fixed a1, s
Rpi(s) =
[∑l−1
i=0 B1i
∑Y
i=l B1i∑l−1
i=0 B1i
∑Y
i=l B1i
]
, pi ∈ Pl (38)
Example. For Y = 3, the 4 possible action likelihood
matrices Rpi are
R1(s) =
[
0 1
0 1
]
, R2(s) =
[
B11 B12 +B13
B21 B22 +B23
]
,
R3(s) =
[
B11 +B12 B13
B21 +B22 B23
]
, R4(s) =
[
1 0
1 0
]
.
(39)
Although somewhat tangential to this paper, it is easily
shown that the agents deploying Protocol 1 exhibit herding
behavior. i.e., there exists regimes where agents choose actions
independent of their private observations; see [26], [27] for the
subtle distinction between herds and information cascades.
C. Quickest Detection with Anticipatory Agents is non-trivial
In classical quickest change detection, the value function
is always concave and the optimal stopping region is convex,
see [39] for a partially observed Markov decision formulation
and proof of this. The aim of this section is to show that
due to the interaction of local and global decision makers,
quickest detection with anticipatory agents exhibits non-trivial
behavior: the value function is not necessarily concave and the
stopping region is not necessarily a convex set.
Consider the value iteration algorithm (34) which is used
as a basis for mathematical induction to prove properties
associated with Bellman’s equation (32). Note that from (34),
Vk(pi, s) is positively homogeneous, that is, for any α > 0,
Vk(αpi, s) = αVk(pi, s). So choosing α = σ(pi, a) yields
Vk+1(pi, s) = min
{
C(pi, 1) (40)
+
∫
S
∑
a
Y+1∑
l=1
Vk(R
l
a(s)P
′pi, s)I(pi ∈ Pl)p(s¯|s)ds¯, C(pi, 2)
}
Recall C(pi, 1) and C(pi, 2) are linear in pi. However, it is
clear from (40) that if Vk(pi, s) is assumed to be concave
on Π, Vk+1(pi, s) is not necessarily concave on Π; since
patching together convex functions on different intervals does
not necessarily yield a convex function. The key point is that
the action likelihoods Rpi (49) are explicit and discontinuous
functions of pi. This results in a possibly non-concave value
function V (pi) making determining S non-convex.
D. Numerical Example of Multi-threshold Quickest Detection
Policy: Change-Blindness
The non-concave value function in quickest detection with
anticipatory agents leads to unusual multi-threshold behavior
in the optimal policy, as we now illustrate.
Consider the quickest detection problem where the state of
nature {xn, n ≥ 0} jumps according to transition matrix
P =
[
1 0
−0.05 0.95
]
.
The global decision maker’s delay and false alarm penalties
are d = 1.05, f = 3; these specify the costs (29), (30) in
Bellman’s equation (32).
The local anticipative decision maker’s reward matrix is
(r2(x, a2), x ∈ {1, 2}, a ∈ {1, 2}) =
[
5 4
6.5 9
]
Also its observation likelihood matrix is B =
[
0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9
]
.
Figure 4 displays the value function and optimal policy
for classical quickest detection. Figure 5 displays the value
function and optimal policy for quickest detection with antici-
patory agents. The policy and value function were obtained by
running the value iteration algorithm for 1000 iterations with
Π = [0, 1] grid quantized uniformly to 1000 values.
For classical quickest detection, Figure 4 shows that, as
expected, the value function is concave and the optimal policy
is a threshold. So the stopping region {pi : φ∗(pi) = 1} is the
interval pi(2) ∈ [0, 0.466].
In contrast for quickest detection involving anticipatory
agents, Figure 5 shows the value function is not concave. Also
the optimal policy has an unusual multi-threshold structure:
if it is optimal to declare a change for a particular posterior
probability, it may not be optimal to declare a change when the
posterior probability of change is larger! (Recall 1−pi(2) is the
posterior probability of change). In this sense, Figure 5 depicts
two forms of change-blindness. First, a human global decision
maker might choose to ignore the optimal policy φ∗(pi) and
simply use the classical quickest detection policy φ∗(pi). A
second, and more interesting form of change-blindness occurs
when the human global decision maker chooses the “simple”
stopping set as pi(2) ∈ [0, a] and ignore the important regions
between [a, b] where it is optimal to stop.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1
2
(a) Optimal Policy
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
(b) Value Function
Fig. 4: Classical Quickest Detection. The optimal policy φ∗(pi)
has a threshold structure. So the optimal stopping set S = {pi :
φ∗(pi) = 2} is convex. The value function V(pi) is concave.
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1
2
a b
(a) Optimal Policy
(b) Value Function
Fig. 5: Quickest Detection with Anticipatory Agents. The
optimal policy φ∗(pi) has a multi-threshold structure implying
that the optimal stopping set S = {pi : φ∗(pi) = 2} is
not convex (comprises of disconnected regions). The global
decision maker exhibits rational change blindness. As the
posterior probability of change pi(1) = 1−pi(2) increases from
b to a, the global decision maker declares there is no change
in several regions. The value function V(pi) is not concave.
E. Blackwell Dominance Implications for Optimal Cost
In this section we show that quickest detection with antici-
pative agents (Protocol 1) results in a cumulative Kolmogorov
Shiryaev cost Jφ∗(pi, s) (defined in (27) or equivalently (31))
that is always larger than that of classical quickest detection.
In Protocol 1, agents have access to the public belief (which
depends on local decisions of previous agents) instead of
the actual observations. One expects that this information
loss results in less efficient quickest time change detection
compared to classical quickest detection. Here we confirm
this intuition. The main idea involves Blackwell dominance
of observation measures. The result is useful because even
though explicit computation of the optimal policy for the setup
in Protocol 1 is difficult, we can lower bound the optimal
achievable cost by that of classical quickest detection.
First define the optimal policy and cost in classical quickest
change detection. Similar to (32), the optimal policy φ∗(pi)
and cost V(pi) incurred in classical quickest detection, satisfy
the following stochastic dynamic programming equation:
φ∗(pi) = argmin
u∈U
Q(pi, u), V(pi) = min
u∈U
Q(pi, u), (41)
where Q(pi, 2) = C(pi, 2) +
∑
y∈Y
V (T (pi, y))σ(pi, y),
Q(pi, 1) = C(pi, 1), Jµ∗(pi) = V(pi).
Here T (pi, y) is the Bayesian filter update defined in (22) and
Jµ∗(pi) is the cumulative cost of the optimal policy starting
with initial belief pi. Note that unlike Protocol 1, in classical
quickest detection, there is no public belief update (23) or
interaction between the public and private beliefs.
The following theorem says that for any initial belief pi,
the optimal detection policy with anticipative agents acting
sequentially (Protocol 1) incurs a higher cumulative cost than
that of classical quickest detection.
Theorem 4. Consider the quickest time detection problem
involving anticipatory agents described in Protocol 1 and
associated value function V(pi, s) in (32). Consider also the
classical quickest detection problem with value function V(pi)
in (41). Then for any initial belief pi ∈ Π, the optimal
cost incurred by classical quickest detection is smaller than
that of quickest detection with anticipatory agents. That is,
V(pi) ≤ V(pi, s) for all pi ∈ Π, s ∈ S.
The proof is in the supplementary document. Since the
theorem holds when A = Y = {1, 2}, i.e., equal number
of local decision choices and observation symbols, a naive
explanation that information is lost due to using fewer symbols
in A compared to Y is not true.
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. From (25)
Rpix,a(s) =
∫
Y
Bx,yM
pi
y,a,sdy,
where Mpiy,a,s
defn
= I(µ∗2,T (pi,y)(s, an,1) = a)
(42)
where B and Mpi are stochastic kernels. Thus observation
y with conditional distribution specified by B is said to be
more informative than (Blackwell dominates) observation a
with conditional distribution Rpi, see [39]. The main idea in
the proof is that under the assumptions of Theorem 4, the
value function V(pi) is concave for pi ∈ Π. Then the result is
established using Jensen’s inequality together with Blackwell
dominance on the Bellman’s equation.
Blackwell dominance was used in [44] to show optimality of
myopic policies. Our use of Blackwell dominance in Theorem
4 is different since we are using it to compare the value
functions of two different dynamic programming problems. A
useful consequence of Theorem 4 is that performance analysis
of standard quickest detection [17] applies as a lower bound
for quickest detection with anticipatory agents.
VI. DISCUSSION
This paper is an early step in addressing sequential detection
problems with behavioral economics constraints. Although
both signal processing and behavioral economics are mature
areas, engineering insights gained by construction of genera-
tive models, estimation algorithms, along with careful analysis
is crucial in understanding human-sensor systems.
They main results of the paper are:
1) Formulation of the two stage decision making model of
[1] for individual decision makers involving the antic-
ipatory state. The key idea is that the anticipatory state
involves the probabilities of future actions thereby leading
to time inconsistency in decision making.
2) Characterizing the structure of the subgame Nash equilib-
rium as a bang-bang controller in the first time stage, and
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a threshold policy at the second time stage (Theorem 1).
The bang-bang structure justifies the observation in [1]
that agents with anticipatory emotions may choose to
deliberately avoid information.
3) Formulation of the multiagent quickest detection problem
where the anticipatory agents interact with a global
decision maker. This mimics team-situation awareness.
4) Structural characterization of the unusual structure of the
optimal change detection policy. Sec.V characterizes the
structure of the Bayesian belief updates and achievable
cost of the quickest detector without brute force com-
putations. It derives important structural properties of
the Bayesian updates of the local and global decision
makers (Theorem 2 and Theorem 3), constructs a lower
bound for the optimal cost incurred using Blackwell
dominance (Theorem 4), and presents numerical exam-
ples of the unusual structure of the optimal quickest
change policy (non-convex stopping region). The multi-
threshold change detection policy can be interpreted as
a form of change blindness, namely people fail to detect
surprisingly large changes to scenes.
In future work we will generalize the anticipatory model
using the subjective belief multi-horizon formulation of [25].
It is also worthwhile conducting a performance analysis of a
multi-threshold detector; see for example [17] for performance
analysis involving a single threshold detector.
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Supplementary Document
Abstract—The main paper gave a complete description of
anticipatory decision making and quickest change detection
with anticipatory decision makers. This supplementary document
contains a detailed example of anticipatory decision making in
terms of a social media accommodation example. Then proofs of
theorems stated in the main paper are given.
VII. TUTORIAL EXAMPLE. SOCIAL MEDIA BASED
ACCOMMODATION CHOICE
We now discuss an anticipatory decision making exam-
ple involving choosing accommodation using a social-media
based online agency such as Airbnb. The example is a slight
generalization of [1] since the rewards are parametrized by
a Bayesian posterior η (the motivation for this in terms of
quickest detection is discussed in the paper).
A. Single Anticipatory Agent
Suppose an anticipatory agent chooses between a vacation
either at a previous known accommodation (K), or a new
accommodation (N ). The agent has initial wealth of w0.
1) Model: The reviews of accommodation N posted at an
online reputation website at times k = 1, 2 are reviewk ∈
{G (good), B (bad)}. The physical states s1 and s2 denote
the probability of good review of N at times 1 and 2. For
simplicity, assume s2 is uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
Regarding the actions, at the first stage the agent chooses
action a1 ∈ [0, 1] which denotes making a non-refundable
deposit 2000 a1 for booking K . At the second stage, the agent
makes the final choice of which accommodation to stay in, i.e.,
a2 ∈ A2 = {K,N}.
Next we model the anticipatory emotions of the agent. Sim-
ilar to [1], we choose the anticipatory reward to reflect beliefs
about pleasure that will be derived in staying respectively at
venues K and N . We choose the psychological (anticipatory)
state z1 at time 1 as the conditional probabilities (see (5))
z1 = max{6000 p(a2 = N, review2 = G|a1, µ2),
4000 p(a2 = K|a1, µ2)}
(43)
So the anticipatory pleasure increases with the agent’s cer-
tainty that an outcome will occur. Also (43) specifies that the
anticipatory pleasure is higher for N (since it scaled by 6000)
compared to K providing that review2 is good.
We now construct the rewards r1, r2 defined in (6).
1) Assume each accommodation costs 2000 units.
2) After making a deposit of 2000a1 for K , if N is chosen,
then the deposit of 2000a1 is lost.
3) The benefit accrued by staying in N when rating is s2
is 6000s2η; the reward for choosing K is 4000. Here
11
η ∈ [0, 1] is the posterior probability that accommodation
N is suitable given the most recent review of N .
4) Finally, β > 0 denotes the importance of anticipatory
reward relative to the reward of the vacation (see (A6)).
11We assume η = [η(1), η(2)]′ is a 2-dimensional probability vector, i.e.,
m = 2 in (14). For rotational convenience, we refer to η(2) as η.
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Based on the above description, the rewards are
r1 = βz1, β > 0
rη,2(s2, a2 = N, a1) = 6000s2η + w0 − 2000(1 + a1),
rη,2(s2, a2 = K, a1) = 4000 + w0 − 2000
2) Structural Result for Nash equilibrium: For the above
example, we can verify Assumptions (A1)-(A7) hold and
therefore Theorem 1 holds. Specifically, (A1) holds by for-
mulation; (A2) holds trivially since rη,2 is linear in a1; (A3)
holds since rη,2(s2, a2 = K, a1) is independent of s2; (A4)
and (A5) hold trivially since ∆η is linear in s2 and a1; (A6)
holds by construction since it is easily shown that for optimal
policy µ∗2, z1 = 4000 p(a2 = K|a1, µ
∗
2). Finally, (A7) holds
since p(s2) is the uniform density.
Therefore from Theorem 1 it follows that µ∗2 has a threshold
structure (16), and µ∗1 has a bang-bang structure (17).
Therefore the interpretation of deliberate avoidance of in-
formation discussed below Theorem 1 holds. Specifically, due
to the bang-bang structure of (17), the agent makes a full
deposit a1 = 1 if β > β
∗ for the accommodation K . Yet this
full non-refundable deposit does not guarantee that the agent
will choose a2 = K since if s2 > s
∗
2(a1), then the agent will
choose a2 = N . Thus the agent might deliberately choose not
to observe the state s2 in order not to lose the deposit paid at
time 1 to secure K .
3) Explicit Evaluation of Nash equilibrium: Given the
simple structure, we can go beyond Theorem 1 and actually
solve explicitly for the subgame Nash equilibrium specified
by (8), (10). The computations below are similar to [1].
From the extended Bellman equation (8), µ∗2(s2, a1) has
threshold structure
µ∗2,η(s2, a1) = argmax
a2
rη,2(s2, a2, a1) =
{
N if s2 ≥
2+a1
3η
K s2 <
2+a1
3η
(44)
with associated value function
V2(s2, µ1, µ
∗
2) = max
a2
{rη,2(s2, a2, a1)}
=
{
6000s2η + w0 − 2000(1 + a1) s2 ≥
2+a1
3η
4000 + w0 − 2000 s2 <
2+a1
3η
In order to determine the policy µ∗1 and value function V1,
let us first compute the psychological state z1 in (43) under
µ∗2. Since s2 is uniformly distributed in [0, 1], clearly
p(a2 = K|a1, µ
∗
2) = P({s2 : µ
∗
2(s2) = K}|a1)
=
∫
S
p(s2|s1)I(s2 : µ
∗
2(s2 = K)) ds2
=
∫
S
p(s2) I(s2 ∈ [0,
2 + a1
3η
])ds2 =
2 + a1
3η
(45)
p(a2 = N, review2 = G|s2, a1, µ
∗
2)
= p(review2 = G)p(a2 = N |a1, s2, µ
∗
2) = s2 I(s2 ∈ [
2 + a1
3η
, 1])
Therefore,
p(a2 = N, review2 = G |a1, µ
∗
2)
=
∫
S
s2 I(s2 ∈ [
2 + a1
3η
, 1])p(s2)ds2 =
∫ 1
2+a1
3η
s2ds2
=
9η2 − 4− 4a1 − a
2
1
18 η2
(46)
Then using notation (9) and (43), the psychological state is
z1 = max{4000 p(a2 = K|a1, µ
∗
2),
6000p(a2 = N, review2 = G |a1, µ
∗
2)}
= 4000 p(a2 = K|a1, µ
∗
2) (47)
Then substituting V2 computed in (44) into (10) yields
V1(s1) = max
a1∈A1
{βz1 +
∫ 1
0
V2(s2)ds2}
It is easily verified that the expression within {·} is convex in
a1. Since A1 = [0, 1] is convex, the maximum is achieved at
an extreme point a1 = 0 or a1 = 1. Thus the optimal policy
µ∗1 at time 1 is a (β, η) dependent bang-bang policy:
µ∗1,η =
{
1 (full deposit) if β > 1− 3η + 9η
2
4
0 (no deposit) if β ≤ 1− 3η + 9η
2
4
(48)
Recall η is a Bayesian parameter (see footnote 11) that will
be defined as the private belief in Sec.IV in the context of
quickest detection, and β > 0 is a scaling constant (A6).
B. Quickest Change Detection
Here we comment on how the above example extends to
social media based decision making such as media based
accommodation systems. Individual anticipatory agents make
local decisions sequentially whether to rent a property; these
decisions are affected by the reviews (decisions) of previous
agents. The global decision maker (e.g. Airbnb) monitors these
local decisions. How can the global decision maker detect
if there is a sudden change in the demand for a specific
accommodation due to the presence of a new competitor?
Alternatively, how can the global decision maker detect a
sudden change in the quality of an accommodation?
1) The underlying state of nature xn is the intrinsic value of
the accommodation K; i.e., the ground truth. The value
of xn depends on the cost of K and cost of competitors.
2) yn is an extrinsic measurement made by the agent regard-
ing xn. yn is an interpretation of a competitor, a recent
photo/review comparing K with a competitor, etc.
3) pin−1: This is the histogram available to the agent from
the rating site comparing K with a competitor and so is
reflective of p(xn−1|a1, . . . , an−1).
4) Recall sn denotes the probability of good reviews of N .
As discussed in the main paper, by allowing the transition
kernel of sn to depend on the ground truth xn, we allow
for the reviews to change with changing ground truth.
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5) The agent updates its belief ηn based on this information.
The Bayesian update is a useful idealization12 of the
agent’s behavior; see Theorem 2 below.
6) The agent then makes decisions an,1, an,2 according to
Protocol 1.
Given the sequence of decisions {an}, the global decision
maker (e.g. Airbnb) wishes to detect if there is a sudden
appearance of competition or sudden change in quality of the
accommodation.
VIII. HUMAN-SENSOR SYSTEM
Quickest change detection involves decision making in a
partially observed Bayesian setting. In the context of this
paper, there are two interpretations.
1) In human-sensor interface systems, each anticipatory
agent is equipped with a sensing/computing device. The
sensing device observes the state of nature (Markov
chain) in noise. The computing device evaluates the
posterior and provides the agent with these probabilities.
The agent (human) then makes anticipatory decisions
a1, a2 as detailed in Sec.III.
2) The second interpretation is as follows: If the anticipative
agent n makes recommendations that are monotone and
ordinal in the observations and monotone in the prior,
then they mimic the Bayesian social learning model. Even
if the agent does not exactly follow a Bayesian social
learning model, its monotone ordinal behavior implies
that such a Bayesian model is a useful idealization.
Humans typically make monotone decisions - the more
favorable the private observation, the higher the recom-
mendation. Humans make ordinal decisions.
IX. PROOFS OF THEOREMS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Remark. Relaxing Assumption (A4). Instead of (A4), the
following weaker condition based on the classic implicit
function theorem [38] can be used. Assume (i) ∆η(s2, a1) has
continuous first partial derivatives; (ii) ∆η(s
∗
2, a1) = 0 =⇒
∂∆η(s
∗
2, a1)/∂s2 6= 0. Then by the implicit function theorem,
the solution s∗2(a1) is continuously differentiable on an open
subset of (0, 1). Assume that this subset is convex.
Proof. For convenience we omit parameter η in the notation.
Statement 1. By (A3), rη,2 is supermodular in (s2, a2).
Thus by Topkis theorem [36], µ∗2(s2, a1) is non-decreasing
in s2 for fixed a1. So either µ
∗
2(s2, a1) is constant wrt s2 (in
which case the theorem holds trivially); or for each a1 there
exists an indifference state s∗2 ∈ [0, 1] such that µ
∗
2(s2, a1)
switches from 1 to 2 as s2 increases. Clearly the indifference
set {s2, a1 : ∆η(s2, a1) = 0} determines where µ
∗
2(s2, a1)
switches from 1 to 2. By (A4), a solution s∗2(a1) exists to
∆η(s2, a1) = 0 for a1 ∈ (0, 1). Hence, µ
∗
2 has the threshold
structure (16).
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reasonable conditions, the decisions made by agents are ordinal functions of
their private observations and monotone in the prior information. Thus the
Bayesian update follows simple intuitive rules and is a useful idealization.
Statement 2. Proving statement 2, is equivalent to showing
convexity in a1 of the solution s
∗
2(a1) of the algebraic equation
∆η(s2, a1) = 0. By (A4), s
∗
2(a1) is continuously differentiable
in a1. It is verified by elementary calculus that
∂2s∗2
∂a21
=
1
(∂∆η/∂s2)2
[∂∆η
∂a1
∂2∆η
∂s2a1
−
∂∆η
∂s2
∂2∆η
∂a21
]
So s∗2(a1) is convex in a1 iff (A5) holds; see [37] for a more
general multidimensional result.
Statement 3(a). From (A6), the psychological state is
z1 = max{
∫
S
I(s2 : µ
∗
2(s2, a1) = a)Ψ(a, s2) p(s2|s1) ds2}
= max
{
F1(s
∗
2(a1))− F1(0), F2(1)− F2(s
∗
2(a1))
}
where Fa(y) =
∫ y
0
Ψ(a, s2) p(s2|s1) ds2
By (A7), F1(y) and −F2(y) are increasing convex functions of
y. Since s∗2(a1) is convex in a1 (by Statement 2), the composi-
tion functions F1(s
∗
2(a1)) and −F2(s
∗
2(a1)) are convex. Thus
r1 = βz1 being the max of two convex functions is convex
in a1. This together with (A2) implies that the reward-to-go
J1(s1, a1, µ
∗
2) is convex in a1.
Statement 3(b). Finally a convex function on a convex set
(recall a1 ∈ A1 = [0, 1]) achieves its global maximum at an
extreme point [45, Theorem 3, pp.181]. Hence the bang-bang
structure (17) holds for µ∗1.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The proof uses MLR stochastic dominance (defined in
footnote 9) and the following single crossing condition:
Definition (Single Crossing [46]). g : Y × A → IR satisfies
a single crossing condition in (y, a) if g(y, a) − g(y, a¯) ≥ 0
implies g(y¯, a) − g(y¯, a¯) ≥ 0 for a¯ > a and y¯ > y. Then
a∗(y) = argmina g(y, a) is increasing in y.
By (A8) it follows that [39] the Bayesian update satisfies
ByP
′pi
1′ByP ′pi
≤r
By¯P
′pi
1′By¯P ′pi
, y¯ > y
where≤r is the MLR stochastic order. (Indeed, the MLR order
is closed under conditional expectation.) By supermodularity
(A9) ra+1−ra is a vector with increasing elements. Therefore
(ra+1 − ra)
′ ByP
′pi
1′ByP ′pi
≤ (ra+1 − ra)
′By¯P
′pi
1′By¯pi
Since the denominator is non-negative, it follows that (ra+1−
ra)
′By¯pi ≤ 0 =⇒ (ra+1 − ra)
′Bypi ≤ 0. This implies that
r′aBypi satisfies a single crossing condition in (y, a). Therefore
an(pi, y) = argmaxa r
′
aBypi is increasing in y for any belief pi.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The single crossing property (35) implies
{pi : (r1 − r2)
′ByP
′pi ≤ 0} ⊆ {pi : (r1 − r2)
′By¯P
′pi ≤ 0}
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for y < y¯. This implies (36). From (25) we can write
Rpix,a(s) =
∑
Y
Bx,yM
pi
y,a,s,
where Mpiy,a,s
defn
= I(µ∗2,T (pi,y)(s, an,1) = a)
(49)
where B and Mpi are stochastic matrices. This yields (38).
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. It is well known [39] (and straightforwardly demon-
strated by induction) that the value function V k(pi) for clas-
sical quickest detection is concave over Π for any k. We then
use the Blackwell dominance condition (49). The public belief
update (23) can be expressed in terms of the private belief
update (22) as
T¯ (pi, a, s) =
∑
y∈Y
T (pi, y)
σ(pi, y)
σ¯(pi, a, s)
Mpiy,a,s
and σ¯(pi, a, s) =
∑
y∈Y
σ(pi, y)Mpiy,a,s (50)
Note that
σ(pi,y)
σ¯(pi,a,s)M
pi
y,a,s is a probability measure wrt y. Since
Vk(·) is concave for pi ∈ Π, using Jensen’s inequality it
follows that
Vk(T¯ (pi, a, s)) = Vk

∑
y∈Y
T (pi, y)
σ(pi, y)
σ¯(pi, a, s)
Mpiy,a,s


≥
∑
y∈Y
Vk(T (pi, y))
σ(pi, y)
σ¯(pi, a, s)
Mpiy,a,s
Therefore for each s¯ ∈ S,∑
a
Vk(T¯ (pi, a, s¯)) σ¯(pi, a, s¯) ≥
∑
y
Vk(T (pi, y))σ(pi, y).
Therefore multiplying by p(s¯|s) and integrating we have∫
S
∑
a
V k(T¯ (pi, a, s¯)) σ¯(pi, a, s¯)p(s¯|s) ds¯
≥
∑
y
V k(T (pi, y))σ(pi, y). (51)
The proof of Theorem 4 then follows by mathematical
induction using the value iteration algorithm (34). Assume
Vk(pi, s) ≥ Vk(pi) for pi ∈ Π. Then
C(pi, 2) +
∫
S
∑
a
Vk(T¯ (pi, a, s¯), s¯)σ¯(pi, a, s¯) p(s¯|s)ds¯
≥ C(pi, 2) +
∫
S
∑
a
Vk(T¯ (pi, a, s¯)) σ¯(pi, a, s¯) p(s¯|s)ds¯
≥ C(pi, 2) +
∑
y
Vk(T (pi, y))σ(pi, y)
where the second inequality follows from (51). Thus
Vk+1(pi, s) ≥ Vk+1(pi). This completes the induction step.
Since value iteration converges pointwise, V(pi, s) ≥ V(pi)
thus proving the theorem.
